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That [the public schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for
the scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we
are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount
important principles of our government as mere platitudes.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The task of balancing the rights and freedoms of the individual
against the need for order is a difficult one in any society that chooses
to assume the status of being civilized. Yet, as delicate as such a bal-
ancing function may be in society in general, it is even more difficult
to perform in the environment of the public schools. On one hand, the
concern for the rights of the individual students in the school system
is compelling, as illustrated by the statement of Mr. Justice Jackson
quoted above. On the other hand, because of the dual functions of
education and socialization that the primary and secondary schools of
this nation are designed to serve, there is an extreme need for a some-
what greater degree of discipline and control than is present in
everday society. Given the problems that are prevalent in today's pub-
* To my six weeks in the Black Tower, and other remembrances of pre-
jurisprudential sanity. May I someday return.
1. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
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lic schools,2 the balancing of these interests has become more crucial
and more difficult.
The United States Supreme Court has undertaken this task on a
number of occasions. The Court has rendered decisions delineating
students' rights of free speech and expression,3 freedom from cruel
and unusual punishment,4 procedural due process,5 and freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures.6 These decisions have not always
been consistent, not only with each other, but also with cases decided
at the same time in other contexts. Without a doubt, much of the in-
consistency can be attributed to a changing perception of the vitality of
individual rights in general, and the conditions within the public
school system.
The purpose of this Article is to scrutinize these decisions with re-
gard to their internal reasoning and their impact as policy. In addi-
tion, there will be an examination of what this author believes to be
the most recent area of students' rights the Court has begun to de-
velop: those protected by the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment. This examination will be made in light of the school prayer
decisions7 and the other students' rights cases studied herein.
II. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
The seminal case in the area of the first amendment freedoms of
speech and expression in the context of public schools is West Vir-
ginia State Board of Education v. Burnette.8 In that case, a group of
Jehovah's Witness public school students challenged the constitution-
ality of a West Viriginia school board regulation requiring students to
2. In recent years, schools across the country have been beset with disciplinary
problems, most notably an increase in violent behavior and drug use. See gener-
ally 1 NAT'L INST. EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, VIOLENT
SCHOOLS - SAFE SCHOOLS: THE SAFE SCHOOL STUDY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
(1978).
3. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (first
amendment protects student protests that do not materially and substantially in-
terfere with discipline); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (first amendment prohibits states from making salute of the flag
compulsory.)
4. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (eighth amendment prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment does not apply in public schools).
5. Id. (due process not violated by failure to give notice and hearing before corporal
punishment is administered); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (due process re-
quires at least informal notice and hearing before suspension from school of 10
days or less).
6. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) (fourth amendment does not require
probable cause standard in searching students, but only one of reasonableness).
7. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
8. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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salute the flag. Failure to comply with the statute was an act of "in-
subordination" and was to be dealt with accordingly.9
The students brought suit requesting injunctive relief to restrain
enforcement of the regulations against Jehovah's Witnesses. They al-
leged that saluting the flag was a violation of their religious beliefs,
and that being compelled to do so was an infringement of their first
amendment right to free exercise of religion.O The board of educa-
tion, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Minersville School
District v. Gobitis,11 argued that the compulsory flag salute law did
not violate the students' constitutional rights.' 2
The Court, in rendering a decision that the compulsory flag salute
was unconstitutional, relied upon the broader grounds of freedom of
speech and expression. Stating that censorship or supression of opin-
ion required a showing of a clear and present danger of unlawful con-
duct,13 it reasoned that compelling an involuntary affirmation would
require even more urgent and immediate grounds.14 The Court found
no such grounds in the board's articulated interest in fostering the at-
tainment of national unity.15
Addressing its recent decision in Gobitis that had reached the op-
posite result, the Court stated that the Jehovah's Witnesses in that
case had simply asked for exemption, based on religious grounds, from
an exercise of state power that everyone had presumed to be legiti-
mate.'6 However, in spite of the fact that this assumption was present
in Burnette,17 the Court nevertheless held that the entire compulsory
flag-saluting practice was illegitimate. In so doing, the Court estab-
lished clearly, for the first time,' 8 that students did have constitutional
9. Id. at 626. The act of insubordination was dealt with by expulsion, and readmis-
sion was denied until compliance. In the interim, the child was considered unlaw-
fully absent, and his parents were subject to prosecution for violation of the
compulsory attendance law. Id. at 629.
10. Id. at 629. The students also alleged infringement of freedom of speech, due pro-
cess, and equal protection, but the result demanded was merely restraint against
application to Jehovah's Witnesses. Id. at 629-30. Thus it can be inferred that the
religious claim was the basis of their action.
11. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
12. The regulation requiring the salute of the flag took much of its language from the
Gobitis opinion. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
626 n.2 (1943).
13. Id. at 633.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 640.
16. Id. at 635 n.16.
17. "[The arguments in this case assume] that power exists in the State to impose the
flag salute discipline on school children in general." Id. at 635.
18. While other cases had dealt indirectly with the state's power to regulate public
schools, they had primarily been concerned with the rights of parents as against
the state. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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protections within the confines of the public school.
The Court's next occasion to adjudicate the free speech and expres-
sion of rights of students came in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District.19 In Tinker, a small group of public
school students had decided to don black armbands as a symbol of pro-
test against the Vietnam War. Prior to the beginning of this protest,
the principals of the Des Moines schools met and adopted a policy
against the wearing of the armbands.20 If a student wore one to
school, he would first be asked to remove it. If he refused, he would
be suspended until he returned without it.21
The students wore their armbands to school, refused to remove
them, and were suspended. They did not return to school until after
the planned period of protest was over.22 Thereafter, they filed a suit
requesting injunctive relief on the basis that the school policy had vio-
lated the students' rights of free speech and expression. The district
court, stating that the action of the school authorities was reasonable
in order to maintain discipline, dismissed the complaint. 23 The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, en banc, was equally divided, and therefore
affirmed.24
The Supreme Court determined initially that the wearing of the
armbands was "symbolic speech" and should be accorded first amend-
ment protection.25 The Court stated that, in fact, the wearing of the
armbands, though symbolic in nature, was closely akin to pure speech
and therefore merited comprehensive protection. Because of this,
while the school officials may have been reasonable in predicting a
disturbance as a result of the armbands, their wearing could not be
prohibited simply because of "fear or apprehension of disturbance."26
The Court rejected the reasonableness standard of the district
court and instead asked whether the conduct would "'materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline
in the operation of the school.' "27 Applying this standard, the Court
stated that nothing in the record indicated that fear or anticipation of
that type of disruption,28 and focused its analysis on what appeared to
19. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
20. The wearing of armbands was to commence on Dec. 16, 1965. The principals met
and adopted the policy prohibiting such conduct on Dec. 14, 1985. Id. at 504.
21. Id.
22. The plan was to wear the armbands from Dec. 16 to Dec. 31. Id.
23. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa
1966).
24. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.
1967).
25. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
26. Id. at 508.
27. Id. at 509, quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
28. It is worth noting that the testimony of school authorities at trial indicated that
the regulation was directed against the principle of the demonstration itself.
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be a single-minded penchant of school officials to quash debate on the
Vietnam War. Citing the fact that other efforts to discuss the war had
been silenced,2 9 and that the only political symbol that had been pro-
hibited was a black armband, the Court stated that "state-operated
schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism,"30 and that "[i]n the
absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regu-
late their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of
their views."3'
Tinker, while a positive decision to the extent that it guarantees
broad free speech protections to public school students, leaves a
number of questions unanswered. Of these, two are most disturbing.
The first is whether a public school is a public forum - that is,
whether a school could prohibit all forms of political speech. The sec-
ond is whether the "material and substantial disruption" that Tinker
states may form the basis for prohibition of conduct must be inherent
in the conduct itself, or merely be a likely result thereof.
With respect to the public forum issue, it is important to note that
the Court in Tinker emphasized the close relationship between the
free market of ideas guaranteed by the first amendment and the edu-
cational function of the public schools.32 In addition, while the Court
did focus on the fact that the ban on the armbands was discrimination,
it did so in order to demonstrate that the aim of the ban was to fore-
close discussion of the Vietnam War,33 and probably not for the pur-
pose of implying that a ban on all political expression would be
unconstitutional.
Further, the fact that many schools open their facilities to political
and other organizations for meetings34 lends further credence to their
status as a public forum of some degree.3 5 Finally, it is important to
consider the standard set forth in Tinker itself. Application of the
School authorities felt that the public school was an inappropriate forum for
political discussion and stated that if students did not like the way our elected
officials ran things, the appropriate remedy was the ballot box. Id. at 509 n.3.
This was an interesting proposal: in 1965, the year of the protest, public school
students who could vote were very rare, since the required age was 21.
29. The Court noted that one student who had wished to write an article on the Viet-
nam War and have it published in the school paper was "dissuaded" from so doing
by school officials. Id. at 510 n.5.
30. Id. at 511. The school permitted the wearing of national campaign buttons, and
even the Iron Cross, traditionally a symbol of Nazism. Id. at 510.
31. Id. at 511.
32. Id. at 512-13.
33. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
34. Cf Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (opening university campus to meet-
ings creates public forum; state may not discriminate against religious groups).
35. A number of commentators have applied the label "educational public forum" to
allow the nature of the standard of content regulation (material and substantial
disturbance) to comport with traditional, content-neutral public forum analysis.
See, eg., Horning, The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969 DuKE
1986]
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"materially and substantially" disruptive test in the public schools
seems to imply that some type of protected public forum exists
there.3 6
The second unanswered question is somewhat more puzzling. Who
must cause the "material and substantial" disruption of the school
function: the protesters, or those who witness and react to the con-
duct? Clearly, if the protest itself is of such a nature as to cause the
disruption, then it will not be protected. In this respect, the armbands
in Tinker may have merited greater protection than actual speech.37
Fundamentally, the inquiry must be whether Tinker states that to
be prohibited, the conduct must be disruptive or must cause disrup-
tion. For example, if a high school student wears a "Hinckley should
have used a .44" button to school,38 will he or she be protected if the
school's chapter of Teenage Republicans begins to beat him or her
during the middle of a civics lecture? Certainly, the student's conduct
was not, in and of itself, disruptive, but arguably it was the cause of
the disruption. Tinker is susceptible to both readings,39 and it is likely
that today's Court, with its attitude toward constitutional liberties,
would opt for the more restrictive, "causation" reading. Given today's
politically intolerant social climate,40 such a likelihood greatly erodes
Tinker's value as precedent.
Barnette and Tinker provide a useful foundation on which to build
students' first amendment rights. While both are well-reasoned deci-
sions, Tinker, because of its delineation of a standard, has far greater
L.J., 931,944; Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The High School as an Educational Public
Forum, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv., 278, 294 (1970).
36. Consider also this language from Tinker: "Freedom of expression would not
truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent gov-
ernment has provided as a safe haven for crackpots." Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
37. Cf. Nahmod, supra note 35, at 291-92 (comparing the less disruptive nature of the
wearing of armbands to the reading aloud of the contents of a student newspa-
per). Certainly, wearing a black armband to math class would be less disruptive
(and consequently more protected) than chanting "L.B.J. is a baby killer" during
the same class. Of course, time, place, and manner restrictions may come into
play in that situation.
38. This hypothetical in no way reflects this author's attitude toward the President of
the United States.
39. Compare "no showing ... that forbidden conduct would materially and substan-
tially interfere.. .", Tinker v. Des. Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (emphasis added), with "prohibition of expression [not consti-
tutionally permissible]... without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material
and substantial interference .... Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
40. See, e.g., Lincoln Journal, Apr. 6, 1985, at 1, col. 4. The article reports the exploits
of a gang of high school students from affluent families in the Fort Worth, Tex.
area. Politically, the gang was oriented toward Nazism. One of its chief mottos,
which it painted throughout the neighborhood, was "Democrats, communists and
niggers shall perish under the wrath of ... the future Aryan Lords." Id. at 7, col.
2.
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potential applicability as precedent. Unfortunately, whether Tinker
will be useful protection to student expression on controversial sub-
jects or merely a group of hollow words that will protect only speech
on subjects that engender no response depends upon its subsequent
reading by today's Supreme Court.
III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The Supreme Court's first adjudication of the procedural due pro-
cess rights of public school students was in Goss v. Lopez.41 In Goss, a
suit was brought by nine Ohio public high school students who had
been suspended during a period of student unrest in February and
March, 1971.42 The students challenged the constitutionality of the
statute and regulations pursuant to which they were suspended, on
the ground that they afforded them no hearing prior to suspension or
within a reasonable time thereafter.43 A three-judge district court
found the procedure unconstitutional and set forth a number of
mimimum procedures that were constitutionally due to the students. 44
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the Ohio
statute and regulations did not comport with procedural due process.
While noting at the outset that there is no constitutional right to edu-
cation at public expense, it stated that protected interests in property
are not normally found in the Constitution, but in state law. Citing
Board of Regents v. Roth,45 the Court held that in choosing to extend
free public education to all residents between five and twenty-one
years of age, Ohio had created an entitlement to education. This enti-
tlement, under Roth, could form the basis for a property interest.4 6
Having chosen to extend this "right" to an education to a generally
defined class, Ohio could not withdraw the right without the use of
41. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
42. The suspensions were for a variety of conduct, including participation in disrup-
tive demonstrations, physical attacks on police officers and school personnel, and
damage to school property. Id. at 569-70.
43. Id. at 571.
44. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973). The district court stated
that immediate removal of a student was permissible if that student endangered
fellow students, teachers, or school officials, disrupted the academic atmosphere
of the school, or damaged school property. In addition, the district court required
notice of suspension proceedings to the student's parents within 24 hours of the
decision to conduct them, and required a hearing with the student in attendance
within 72 hours of removal. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572 (1975).
45. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
46. Roth clearly held that for procedural due process to apply to a given case, there
must be an infringement of either a property or a liberty interest. Id. at 571-72. It
also made clear that the concepts are to be construed liberally. Id. Prior to Roth,
the Court had relied on a distinction between rights (which were protected) and
privileges (which were not). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in the Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
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fundamentally fair procedures.47
The Court also found a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest
present in Goss. Noting that suspensions such as those at issue in this
case would become a part of a student's record, it stated that liberty
includes protection of a "person's good name, reputation, honor, or in-
tegrity."48 Recognizing that these suspensions could seriously inter-
fere with future prospects for higher education and employment, the
Court held that the suspensions implicated a liberty interest protected
by the due process clause.49
Having determined that a protected interest was implicated in the
case, the court next turned to the administration argument that sus-
pensions of less than ten days were a de minimis infringement of
those interests. This was refuted by reference to prior case law, since,
under Roth, the inquiry as to whether any due process protection was
necessary involved the nature rather than the weight of the interest
involved.5 0 Additionally, the Court felt that, in fact, a suspension of
up to ten days was not a de minimis infringement of a student's
rights.51
Since procedural due process was at issue in Goss, the Court's next
inquiry was what process was due. Citing the doctrine that the most
fundamental requirement of due process was the opportunity to be
heard, the Court held that, at the very minimum, students facing sus-
pension "must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of
hearing."52 The Court went on to state that there was no requirement
that the hearing be formal, and said that even an informal conference
between the student and the disciplinarian would satsify due process,
so long as the student was told of the charges against her and had an
47. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975).
48. Id.
49. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-75 (1975). It is not clear that such an analysis
comports with that employed by the Court in Roth, since that case held that the
refusal to renew an instructor's one-year contract was not sufficiently damaging
to his reputation and future employment prospects to give rise to an infringement
of a liberty interest. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972). One
commentator has suggested that the recording of the suspensions and the reasons
for them in student files is sufficient to distinguish the cases. Note, Due Pro-
cess-Students May Not Be Suspended Without Prior Notice of the Charges and
An Opportunity for A Hearing (Goss v. Lopez U.S. 1975), 6 SETON HALL 568, 579-
80 (1975). Such a distinction seems to grasp at straws. Also, it subsequently has
been held that damage to reputation, without a nexus to more, such as employ-
ment, does not implicate due process. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
50. Id. at 575-76 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972)). The
dissent appears to reject the two-step analysis set forth by Roth, wherein the na-
ture of the interest determines whether due process applies, and the weight of
the interest is considered in balancing the type of process which is due. See Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 586-88 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
51. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975).
52. Id. at 579 (emphasis in original).
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opportunity to give her side of the story.5 3 In addition, while stating
that ideally the hearing would occur prior to removal, since, by its na-
ture, it could occur immediately following the misconduct, the Court
left open the possibility of post-suspension hearings in certain
circumstances. 54
While Goss is a laudable decision in the sense that it establishes
students' rights to procedural due process in the schools, it may be
that the procedures guaranteed by the decision are inadequate.5 5 Both
the majority and the dissent agreed that the procedures mandated by
Goss were less than a fair-minded school principal would impose on
himself in order to avoid unfair suspensions.56 In addition, the Court
did not require that any notice be given to parents, but only to the
accused student.57
Goss also left significant questions unaswered. Of primary impor-
tance is what process is due for longer suspensions or expulsions.
While the Court did indicate that such factual situations would give
rise to more stringent procedural safeguards,58 and there is generally
accepted federal case law on the subject,59 the issue is not decided.
One important question would be at what point, in terms of length of
suspension, the additional safeguards apply.6 0
53. Id. at 581-84.
54. Id. at 582-83. The Court stated that if the student's presence posed a continuing
danger to persons or property, or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic
process, he may be immediately removed, with the hearing to follow as soon as
possible. Id. One commentator has criticized the disruption ground, stating that,
if applied too broadly, it could "render Goss of little practical consequence."
Comment, Student Rights and Due Process: Procedural Requirements of Goss v.
Lopez, 46 Miss. L.J. 1041,1065 (1975). Yet, such a standard seems to comport with
the disruption standard in Tinker, a violation of which would, in all probability,
lead to a suspension.
55. Comment, supra note 54, at 1063-66. The commentator points out that a uniform
rule of procedural due process for short suspensions flies in the face of the flexi-
bility inherent in the standard. Id. at 1065. In addition, it may be that different
students have differing levels of interest in suspensions of the same length. But
see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975).
56. Compare Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975), with id. at 596 n.15 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
57. The Court's failure to do so in Goss may be understandable, since Ohio required
such notice by statute. Id. at 596.
58. Id. at 584.
59. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961) (hearing prior to
expulsion from state college requires "rudiments of adversary proceeding"), cert
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). Dixon has been extended to secondary schools. See,
e.g., Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964); DeJesus v. Penberthy, 344 F.
Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972); Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388
(E.D. Mich. 1969).
60. See Comment, supra note 54, at 1065. At least the Court should be commended
for rendering a decision on the facts before it. Ten years later, today's Court,
with virtually the same personnel, could take a lesson. Cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
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Another question that was unanswered at the time of Goss was the
breadth of students' procedural due process protection. The answer to
that question was, however, made clear just two years later when the
Court virtually ignored the teachings of Goss in Ingraham v. Wright.6 1
In Ingraham, the Court was faced with the issue of what process
was due students prior to the infliction of corporal punishment.6 2 The
petitioners based their action on two paddling incidents that took
place at their junior high school in Dade County, Florida, during 1970.
A Florida statute authorized corporal punishment by negative infer-
ence,63 and many of the schools in Dade County had approved its
use.64 The regulation that permitted the punishment contained ex-
plicit directions as to its use, including the nature of the instrument to
be used.6 5
The students challenged this punishment as being violative of pro-
cedural due process because of the lack of a hearing prior to the ad-
ministration of the punishment. The record below indicated that
there were irregularities in the administration of the punishments in
general,66 and that the particular punishments administered in this
case were excessive.67 In spite of this, the district court found no con-
stitutional basis for relief, holding that no liberty interest was impli-
cated by the beatings.68 The court of appeals, in a hearing before a
three-judge panel, reversed,69 but that judgment was vacated upon a
rehearing en banc, and the judgment of the district court was
affirmed.70
61. 430 U.s. 651 (1977).
62. Ingraham also raised the issue of whether the eighth amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment applied to excessive corporal punishment in the
public schools. For an analysis of that issue, see infra notes 87-114 and accompa-
nying text.
63. The statute in effect in 1970 proscribed punishment that was "degrading or un-
duly severe" or was inflicted without prior consultation with the official in charge
of the school. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.27 (West 1961).
64. The record did not indicate how many schools actually employed corporal punish-
ment, but it did state that 231 of 237 schools had been authorized by the Dade
County School Board to use it. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 655 n.5 (1977).
65. That instrument was a flat wooden paddle, which was less than two feet long,
three to four inches wide, and about one-half inch thick. The normal punishment
consisted of one to five blows with the paddle. Id. at 656.
66. It appears that, contrary to the requirements of the Florida statute, teachers fre-
quently adminstered the punishment on their own authority, without first con-
sulting the principle or other officials in charge of the school. Id. at 657 n.8.
67. Ingraham testified that he was subjected to 20 blows with a paddle and suffered a
hematoma, which required medical attention and kept him out of school for sev-
eral days. Id. at 657. Andrews, also a petitioner, testified he was struck on his
arms, one blow depriving him of the full use of his arm for a week. Id. Other
students also testified as to the severity of other beatings. Id. at n.l1.
68. The opinion of the district court was unreported.
69. Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974).
70. Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976).
[Vol. 65:161
STUDENTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
In addressing the procedural due process issue, the Court disagreed
with the holding of the court of appeals and found a constitutionally
protected liberty interest implicated in the administration of corporal
punishment.71 Accordingly, the question became what process was
due. On this question, the Court stated that the analysis required con-
sideration of the private interest affected, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of that interest, the probable value, if any, of additional
procedural safeguards, and the state interest, including fiscal and ad-
ministrative burdens.72 After performing this analysis, the Court con-
cluded that the state law remedies provided by Florida were sufficient
to protect the students' interests, and that no additional procedures
were required.7 3
In so doing, the Court relied on a number of factors which, upon
closer analysis, do not support its conclusion. The major mistake
made by the Court was its reliance on Florida law to provide an ade-
quate vindication of students' liberty interest. While Florida law did
provide a remedy for excessive corporal punishment, no action would
lie for erroneous corporal punishment.74 Also, any remedy that would
deter 75 erroneous punishment would nevertheless be inadequate sim-
ply because it would be compensatory rather than preventive.7 6 Be-
cause of these inadequacies, the Court was clearly incorrect in stating
that the state law safeguards were adequate and that little would be
gained by adding additional safeguards.
Secondly, the Court suggested that risk of erroneous deprivation of
the liberty interest was insubstantial because of the absence of Florida
cases involving suits for excessive corporal punishment. This dearth
of suits, according to the Court, made it clear that excessive corporal
punishment is exceedingly rare.7 7 Aside from the fact that the inci-
dence of suits for excessive punishment is only tangentially relevant to
the issue of erroneous deprivation of a liberty interest, such convo-
luted reasoning by the Court overlooked direct testimony in the rec-
71. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S 651, 673-74 (1977).
72. Id. at 675, citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
73. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675-83 (1977).
74. Id. at 693 (White, J., dissenting). See also Note, Ingraham v. Wright No Process
Due Public Schoolchild Prior to Final Deprivation of Liberty, 39 U. PTT. L. REv.
770, 784-85 (1978).
75. Assuming the Court was not ignorant of the fact that Florida law provided no
remedy for erroneous corporal punishment, its reasoning must suppose that the
existence of an action for excessive punishment would cause officials to be more
cautious in administering punishment. See Note, supra note 74, at 785.
76. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 695-96 (1977) (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White observed: '"The infliction of physical pain is final and irreparable; it cannot
be undone in a subsequent proceeding." Id. at 695 (White, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 677 n.45. This lack of reported decisions may be better explained by other
factors having nothing to do with the frequency of excessive corporal punish-
ment. See Note, supra note 74, at 785-86.
1986]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ord as to excessiveness of punishment.7 8
Finally, the Court made use of an irrelevant analogy to fourth
amendment search and seizure law in order, presumably to demon-
strate that the infringement at issue in Ingraham was not severe
enough to warrant constitutional protection.79 The Court analogized
the situation of a student faced with corporal punishment to that of a
suspect being arrested on probable cause.8 0 In both cases, according to
the Court, there is a determination of fact without an advance hearing.
Because of the arrest practice, the reasoning follows, there is no rea-
son to supply additional procedural safeguards to protect the interest
of the student81
The use of this analogy epitomizes the judicial straw-grasping that
pervades the Ingraham opinion. The reasoning contains three inher-
ent flaws. First, the fourth amendment occupies a unique position in
constitutional law, and its peculiarities should not be extended beyond
their intended context.8 2 Second, the state is not free to continue the
deprivation of liberty caused by a warrantless arrest without proce-
dures to ascertain whether probable cause in fact existed.8 3 Finally,
while incorrect incarceration for a relatively brief time as the result of
an erroneous arrest would be unpleasant, it does not involve a liberty
deprivation of the magnitude of that at issue in Ingraham.8 4
In the final analysis, Ingraham effectively limited Goss to its facts,
if it did not overrule it completely. It must be noted that both cases
were five-to-four decisions, with the Goss dissenters8 5 picking up Mr.
Justice Stewart to form the Ingraham majority. The anamoly created
by the two decisions can best be illustrated by a statement of the
black-letter law that they create. To remove a child from school for
one day, you must tell him what he has done, but if you can surprise
him with a paddle, you are doing nothing unconstitutional.8 6
78. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
79. The Court's analogy does not seem to fit into any of the Eldrige balancing factors,
supra note 72 and accompanying text. Therefore, one must assume that it is sim-
ply the ribbon that ties the entire package together.
80. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 679 (1977).
81. Id. at 680.
82. In fact, Mr. Justice Powell, the author of Ingraham pointed out the unique na-
ture of the fourth amendment in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Speaking
for the Court, he rejected the argument that the procedures outlines in Goss
should apply to a warrantless arrest, stating that such procedures were "inop-
posite and irrelevant in the... criminal justice system." Id. at 125 n.27.
83. Id. at 114, 125. Note that no such remedy as to the correctness of the corporal
punishment exists at any stage under Florida law. See supra notes 74-77 and ac-
companying text.
84. The beatings were severe, see supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text, and phys-
ical injury is "irreparable." Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 695 (1977) (White,
J., dissenting).
85. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Rehnquist.
86. At least according to this Court.
[Vol. 65:161
STUDENTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
IV. EIGHTH AMENDMENT - CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
The petitioners in Ingraham also claimed that the punishment in-
flicted in that case violated the eighth amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment.8 7 The Court rejected that claim with a
broad statement that the eighth amendment was intended to apply
only to criminal proceedings and punishments.88 This decision was
based on three factors: the history of the eighth amendment,8 9 prior
decisions of the Court,9 0 and a policy argument that contrasted prisons
and schools.91 A closer scrutiny of these three bases for the decision
leads to the conclusion that the failure to apply the eighth amendment
was erroneous.92
The Court's analysis of the history of the adoption of the eighth
amendment is, at best, inconclusive.93 In fact, the only point that is
made clear in the cursory historical analysis is that somewhere be-
tween the drafting of the English predecessor of the eighth amend-
ment and the language that is included in the Constitution, specific
language limiting the protections of the amendment to criminal cases
was deleted.94 The only history supportive of the Court's position is
that which the Court itself baldly asserts.95
The precedential leg of the Ingraham tripod is equally devoid of
substance and does not support the Court's position. The Court cited
four cases, 9 6 which are summarily discussed within the same para-
graph, for the proposition that "[i]n the few cases where the Court has
had occasion to confront claims that impositions outside the criminal
process constituted cruel and unusual punishment, it has had no diffi-
culty finding the Eighth Amendment applicable."97 But the cases
cited by the Court do not support such a proposition. The Court's only
reference to the eighth amendment in Fong Yue Ting, the case on
which it primarily relies, was in the context of its conclusion that
87. For a discussion of the facts of Ingraham, see supra notes 62-70 and accompany-
ing text.
88. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977).
89. Id. at 664-66.
90. Id. at 666-68.
91. Id. at 668-71.
92. For an excellent analysis of these factors in greater detail than can be given here,
see Rosenberg, Ingraham v. Wight. The Supreme Court's Whipping Boy, 78
COLUM. L. REv., 75, 76-89 (1978).
93. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 685 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 665.
95. The Court asserted that "[t]he subject [to] which [the American version] was in-
tended to apply - the criminal process - was the same." Id. at 666.
96. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); Bugaje-
witz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698
(1893).
97. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1977).
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aliens have no constitutional rights in deportation proceedings.9 8
The other cases relied upon afford even less support. Mahler v.
Eby,99 and Bugajewitz v. Adams,10 0 are deportation cases stating that
deportation is not punishment but is an exercise of sovereign power
over aliens. Finally, Uphaus v. Wyman,10 1 is at best an ambiguous
case, one that appears to stand for the proposition that civil contempt
was not cruel and unusual, not that it was not punishment.102
Finally, the Court turned to a policy-based analysis of the differ-
ences between the penal and educational systems of this country that
justify the application of the eighth amendment to the former, but not
the latter. Within this analysis, the Court focused on three factors: the
child's freedom to leave school, the constant presence of teachers and
other students, and the supervision of the school by the community.10 3
The Court argues that this open environment of the school, as con-
trasted with the closed environment of the prison, makes application
of the eighth amendment unnecessary.
The factors relied upon by the Court have little relevance. The
opinion of the Court notes that some children (in fact many) are not
permitted to leave school during the day,104 but it is unlikely that a
student could exercise the option (assuming she had one) to leave im-
mediately prior to the infliction of corporal punishment.os Further,
the freedom to hobble home at the end of the day cannot be at all
relevant to the issue of corporal punishment inflicted during school.
Secondly, it is not clear that the presence of others in the school in
any way ameliorates the potential severity of corporal punishment, or
is relevant to the Court's "school-prison" dichotomy. At the outset, it
should be noted that prisoners and other guards may be present dur-
ing prison beatings, yet that fact is not relied upon as an effective de-
98. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893). ("[IThe provisions of the
Constitution, securing the right of trial by jury and prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures ... have no application.)"
99. 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
100. 228 U.S. 585 (1913).
101. 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
102. For a discussion of the precedent relied on in Ingraham, see generally Rosenberg,
supra note 92, at 80-85. One reason for the dearth of applicable precedent on the
issue of the eighth amendment in non-criminal cases may be that "punishments
... are ordinarily not imposed without first affording the accused the full pano-
ply of procedural safeguards provided by the criminal process." Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 686 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 670.
104. Mr. Justice Powell asserts that only the very young are not permitted to leave
school during the day, without citing any authority. Id.
105. Actually, the facts in Ingraham state that when the petitioner tried to resist the
beating, he was held down by three school officials. See Rosenberg, supra note 92,
at 86 n.63.
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terrent to their severity. 06 Also, there is no reason why the actual
beating in the school could not take place in secret.10 7 In addition,
even if there are other students present when the beatings are admin-
istered, it is unlikely that they could in any way control the actions of
the school official.' 0 8
The final factor relied upon by the Court is community supervision
of the schools. While this is arguably a more effective safeguard than
the others upon which the Court relies, it is still not adequate. The
Court overlooks the fact that many states restrict public access to
school grounds. 0 9 In addition, the level of scrutiny for schools with
respect to corporal punishment may be considerably less than that af-
forded to prisons.110 Finally, beaten students are likely to be a minor-
ity that will engender little, if any, public response.Ill
In the final analysis, Ingraham is a decision that reaches a palpably
incorrect result. The holding of Ingraham is that "corporal punish-
ment in the public schools, no matter how barbaric, inhumane, or se-
vere, is never limited by the Eighth Amendment."112 To extend
greater constitutional protection to a convicted criminal than to a
child at school is an unjustifiable anamoly."13 While the rectification
of this anomaly is not irretrievably foreclosed by Ingraham,114 consti-
tutional protection of students from excessive or erroneous corporal
punishment is made highly unlikely by the decision.
106. Ironically, the presence of others in the prison context may provide more of a
safeguard than in the school context; since the reasonable corporal punishment
available to teachers is not generally available to jailers, illegal beatings might be
more easily recognized. Id. at 87.
107. Id.
108. See Note, supra note 74, at 784-85.
109. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1915 (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-112(d) (Cum.
Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1320 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-25
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985).
110. Prisons are often subjected to direct legislative, judicial, or executive supervision
and inspection. Rosenberg, supra note 92, at 87-88.
111. Id. at 88.
112. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 692 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
113. This should not be interpreted as a disparagement of the eighth amendment
rights of prisoners.
114. The petition for certiorari also raised a substantive due process claim, which the
Court expressly declined to consider. Id. at 659 n.12, 679 n.47. Presumably, such a
claim would have raised two issues: the infringement of parental rights that re-
sults from the administration of corporal punishment without parental approval;
and the student's own right to physical autonomy. The former issue seems to
have been settled by the Court's summary affirmance in Baker v. Owen, 423 U.S.
907, affig 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975); however, the latter issue does raise
some interesting questions. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 92, at 100-09.
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V. FREEDOM FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE
One of the Court's most recent journeys into the public school was
New Jersey v. TL.0.115 In T.L.O., the Court seized upon an opportu-
nity to issue a broad pronouncement of public school students' fourth
amendment rights.1G In spite of some glowing rhetoric about the pri-
vacy rights of public school students, T.L.O. essentially held that stu-
dents abandon the bulk of their fourth amendment protections at the
schoolhouse door.
The facts of TL.O. are a commonplace occurrence in any public
school, at least in terms of the suspected violation that gave rise to the
search. T.L.O., a student at Piscataway High School in Piscataway,
New Jersey, was discovered smoking in the lavatory. She was taken
to the office of the Vice Principal Theodore Choplick, who questioned
her about the smoking incident. While a companion of T.L.O. admit-
ted to smoking, T.L.O. denied having done so.1 17
Mr. Choplick then demanded T.L.O.'s purse. Opening the purse,
he found a pack of cigarettes, which he removed. In so doing, he dis-
covered a package of cigarette rolling papers which, "[i]n his experi-
ence," were associated with the use of marijuana.118 Spurred by this
discovery, Choplick proceeded to examine thoroughly the contents of
T.L.O.'s purse. The search revealed a small amount of marijuana, a
pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a substantial quantity of money
in one-dollar bills, a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, and two
letters that implicated T.L.O. in marijuana dealing.119
Choplick turned the seized items over to the police, and after
T.L.O. was taken to the police station, she confessed to having sold
marijuana at the school. The state brought delinquency charges, dur-
ing which T.L.O. moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that
the search was unlawful. The juvenile court denied the motion, using
a standard of reasonableness that it felt should apply to school
searches. 20 Having denied the motion, the juvenile court found
T.L.O. delinquent, and sentenced her to a year's probation.
On appeal, the appellate division affirmed the trial court's finding
on the fourth amendment issue, but vacated the judgement on other
115. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
116. The original issue for which certiorari was granted in TL.O. was whether the
exclusionary rule was applicable to searches conducted by school officials, and
only subsequently did the Court decide to formulate "the proper standard" for all
public school searches. Id. at 759 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Inter-
estingly enough, the TL.O. majority, in a rather curious exercise of judicial re-
straint, expressly declined to decide the exclusionary rule issue. Id. at 739 n.3.
117. Id. at 737.
118. Id. One may inquire as to the source of that experience.
119. Id.
120. State ex rel. TLO., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 341, 428 A.2d 1327, 1333 (1980).
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grounds, and remanded the cause for a new hearing.121 T.L.O. ap-
pealed the fourth amendment issue and the New Jersey Supreme
Court, applying the reasonableness standard employed by both the ju-
venile court and the appellate division, determined that the search by
Choplick had indeed violated the fourth amendment and suppressed
the fruits of that search.1 2 2
The Court began its resolution of the issue by first holding that the
fourth amendment was applicable to searches conducted by school au-
thorities. 2 3 The Court based this holding on two propositions: first,
that school officials are agents of the state; and second, that prior cases
had established that school officials were subject to constitutional
restraints.24
However, the Court went on to state that holding the fourth
amendment applicable to "searches conducted by school authorities is
only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such
searches."' 2 5 In making that inquiry, the Court began by adopting a
contextual balancing approach, stating that reasonableness depends
upon the context of the search and can best be determined by weigh-
ing the need to search against the invasion caused by the search. 2 6
In balancing these factors, the Court recognized that the student
had some legitimate expectation of privacy, but also declared that the
state had a strong interest in maintaining a sound educational environ-
ment. Because of the strength of the state's interest, the Court held
first that no warrant was necessary to permit a school official to search
a student.27
The Court next declared that the "school setting also requires
some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to
justify a search."2s The Court proceeded to balance away the prob-
able cause requirement and adopt a standard of "reasonableness."
The reasonableness standard involves two inquiries: first, whether the
search was justified at its inception; and second, whether the search as
conducted was reasonably related to the circumstances that justified it
in the first place.129 Applying that standard to the facts of T.L.O., the
Court concluded that both prongs of the test were satisfied, and that
121. State ex rel. T.L.O., 185 N.J. Super. 279, 448 A.2d 493 (1982) (remanded to deter-
mine whether T.L.O. had knowingly and voluntarily waived fifth amendment
rights before confessing).
122. State ex rel. T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983).
123. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 739 (1985).
124. Id. at 740-41, citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See also Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
125. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 741 (1985).
126. Id. at 741.
127. Id. at 742-43.
128. Id. at 743.
129. Id. at 743-44.
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the fruits of Choplick's search should not have been suppressed.130
The Court's opinion in T.L.O. has three major conceptual flaws in
its reasoning. First, the Court balances away probable cause as a pre-
requisite to a full-scale search, an unprecedented decision in fourth
amendment law. Second, the abrogation of the probable cause stan-
dard was unnecessary since the standard is flexible and may be tai-
lored to the context of a particular search. Third, the Court's
promulgation of a broad standard for all school searches does not ade-
quately reflect the potential variances in the state's interest, depend-
ing upon the purpose of the search. In short, the Court has virtually
destroyed the vitality of the fourth amendment in the public schools,
and has done so unnecessarily.
Recently, the Court has resorted to balancing tests much more fre-
quently in deciding fourth amendment cases.1 3 ' While such an ap-
proach may have merit, it is not clear that the Court has employed the
balancing tests neutrally, but may instead use them as a guise for "an
unanalyzed exercise of judicial will."132 Whatever the merits of bal-
ancing in the abstract, it is clear that the balancing done in TL.O. is
improper. This is not so much due to the nature of the balancing, but
its extent. Never before had the Court sanctioned a full-scale search
on the basis of a standard of less than probable cause.13 3 While the
Court has, at times, abrogated the probable cause standard, it has done
so only in the context of a "minimally intrusive" search. 3 4
This unprecedented departure from the generally accepted stan-
dard of probable cause is distressing, not only because it tramples
upon the plain language of the fourth amendment, but also because it
130. Id. at 745. The Court stated that there were two searches: the search for ciga-
rettes, and the search for marijuana. The search for cigarettes was reasonable
because even though, as the New Jersey Supreme Court noted, possession of ciga-
rettes was not, in and of itself, a violation of school rules, the possession of the
cigarettes was relevant to the smoking violation. Id. at 745-46. The Court pro-
ceeded to "totempole" the searches by stating that since the reasonable cigarette
search yielded the discovery of the rolling papers, and the rolling papers were
"reasonably" linked to marijuana, the full-scale search of T.L.O.'s purse was thus
justified, making the entire incident reasonable. Id. at 745-47. At the same time,
the Court characterized the New Jersey Supreme Court's notion of "reasonable-
ness" as "somewhat crabbed." Id. at 745.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct.
3194 (1984).
132. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 758 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
133. Id. at 752-53 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
134. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In addition, the Court places some reli-
ance on administrative search cases, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967). But Camara held that the probable cause standards themselves may have
to be modified, and if so only because of the less intrusive nature of administra-
tive searches. Id. at 537.
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is unnecessary. In Illinois v. Gates,'35 the Court characterized the
probable cause standard as one of easy application, being dependent
upon the "totality-of-the-circumstances." 36 Yet, in spite of the
Court's characterization of the standard as "practical," "fluid," and
"flexible,"137 one of its major reasons for adopting the reasonableness
standard in TL.O. was its perception of the difficulties that would be
encountered by school officials in ascertaining probable cause.13 8
Given the fact that the Gates standard is flexible and could be readily
adapted to the context of the public school, such fears seem un-
founded.139 If anything, the reasonableness standard enunciated by
the Court will engender more difficulties and confusion for school
officials.140
Finally, the Court's pronouncement of a broad standard for all
school search cases does not take into account the varying interest that
a state may have in precipitating a given search. The facts of TL.O.
demonstrate this problem. While the Court is articulating the school
officials' interest in terms of drug use and violent crime,141 the viola-
tion that T.L.O. was accused of was smoking cigarettes in the lavatory,
hardly a novel or serious threat to the order of a school system. The
standard set forth in T.L.O. would accord the same interest to the state
in conducting a search for sunglasses (in violation of a dress code) as it
would to a search for a deadly weapon. 42 Such an anomolous result is
endemic to the overreaching approach that the Court used in render-
ing the TL.O. decision.143
T.L.O. does afford students some protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures. But, in using a diluted and over-broad standard,
it opens the door to increased litigation and uncertainty among school
officials and students alike.144 In addition, the amorphous nature of
the reasonableness standard could lead to searches that may be based
upon unfounded rumor or arbitrary objective signs, such as the style
of a student's hair or clothing, those persons a student associates with,
or even race. These searches could be subsequently justified, and in
certain jurisdictions, some of them may be upheld on rather flimsy
grounds.145 Such a result is neither necessary nor sound policy.
135. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
136. Id. at 238.
137. Id. at 232, 238, 239.
138. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 744 (1985).
139. Id. at 756 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
140. Id. at 756-57 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
141. Id. at 742.
142. Id. at 762-63 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
143. See supra note 116. See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 759-62 (1985)
(Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
144. Id. at 756-57 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
145. Cf. R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983), in which the court used
the in loco parentis doctrine to hold the fourth amendment inapplicable to school
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In essence, TL.O. represents the convergence of a decline in the
protection of students' rights and a continuing erosion of the fourth
amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The latter trend has recently become alarming.146 The decline of stu-
dent's rights arguably was a seed planted in the minimal protections
afforded by Goss, which sprouted in Ingraham and came into full
bloom in T.L.O. Such a trend with respect to the rights of students is
distressing since "[t]he schoolroom is the first opportunity most citi-
zens have to experience the power of government,"147 and T.L.O. al-
lows that power to be wielded beyond proper limits.
VI. FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS
Recently, the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional
an Alabama statute that provided for a moment of silence for medita-
tion or voluntary prayer. 48 Although the statute was invalidated be-
cause it violated the establishment clause of the first amendment, the
decision implicated the issue of free exercise rights of public school
students as well. Specifically, Wallace represented an opportunity for
the Court to venture into the doctrine of accommodation of the reli-
gious beliefs of public school students. In rendering its decision, the
Court delineated, albeit indirectly, the permissible scope of such
accommodation.
A number of commentators have advanced theories of what accom-
modation is and how it should be achieved.149 Basically, the argument
for accommodation begins with the premise that children carry their
free exercise rights with them into the public school. From this, it
follows that some means of enjoying those rights should be provided.
However, in providing that opportunity, the state must select a means
that will neither violate the establishment clause not impinge upon
the free exercise rights of other students. The means currently in
vogue are state laws providing for a moment of silence at some point
officials. Any court with such a view of contemporary reality might be able to
reach the conclusion that a student wearing a marijuana leaf beltbuckle or T-
shirt could reasonably be searched for drugs.
146. Mr. Justice Stevens notes that the Court, since the October Term, 1982, has
granted prosecutors relief from suppression orders with "distressing regularity,"
and frequently has relied on grounds not advanced by the parties to do so, as it
did in TL.O. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 761 (1985) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring and dissenting). A review of the cases shows that in 18 of 23 the Court has
refused to suppress evidence. Id. at 761 n.12 (citations omitted).
147. Id. at 767 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
148. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
149. See, e.g., Cornelius, Church and State-The Mandate of the Establishment Clause:
Wall of Separation or Benign Neutrality?, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1984); Buchanan,
Accomodation of Religion in the Public Schools: A Plea for Careful Balancing of
Competing Constitutional Values, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1000 (1981).
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during the school day,15o similar to the statute challenged in Wallace.
The statute in Wallace was one of three passed by the Alabama
Legislature regarding prayer in the public schools.151 One statute au-
thorized a moment of silence "for meditation," 52 and its constitution-
ality was conceded by both sides.153 Another called for teachers to
lead "willing students" in a prescribed prayer to "Almighty God."54
The court of appeals had held that provision unconstitutional,155 and
that part of the decision had been affirmed previously by the Supreme
Court. 56 The statute directly at issue in Wallace provided for a mo-
ment of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer," 57 and had been
enacted subsequent to the statute providing a moment of silence "for
meditation." 5 8
The plaintiffs in Wallace challenged the statute as a violation of
the establishment clause. The district court found that the provision's
sole purpose was an effort by the State of Alabama to encourage reli-
gious activity; however, it upheld the statute because it was of the
opinion that Alabama could establish a religion if it so chose.159 The
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court's finding as to the pur-
pose of the law, but reversed its landmark interpretation of the estab-
lishment clause.160 This judgement was affirmed by the Court.161
In reaching its decision, the Court applied its traditional (and
somewhat maligned) establishment clause test, initially set forth in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.62 The Court placed primary reliance on the sec-
ular legislative purpose criterion of the test, finding that the only pur-
pose for the enactment of the statute was a religious one.163 This
determination was based on statements in the legislative history and a
150. Twenty-five states currently have statutes that permit the or require public
school teachers to observe a moment of silence in their classrooms. Wallace v.
Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2497-98 (1985). For a comparison of some of these provi-
sions, see Note, Daily Moments of Silence in Public Schools: A Constitutional
Analysis, 58 N.Y.U.L. REv. 364, 407-08 (1983).
151. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2483 (1985).
152. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1984).
153. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2482 (1985).
154. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984).
155. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983).
156. Wallace v. Jaffree, 104 S. Ct. 1704 (1984).
157. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1984).
158. Section 16-1-20 was enacted in 1978, while § 16-1-20.1 was enacted in 1981. Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2481 (1985).
159. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1128 (S.D. Ala. 1983).
160. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1535-36 (11th Cir. 1983).
161. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2493 (1985).
162. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). That test provides three criteria. First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose. Second, its principal or primary effect must neither
inhibit nor advance religion. Third, the statute must not create an excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13.
163. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2490 (1985).
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comparison of the statute with Alabama's earlier moment-of-silence
statute.164
The Court rested much of its decision on a statement by the law's
sponsor that the purpose of the statute was to return voluntary prayer
to the public schools.165 The sponsor reiterated this purpose in his
trial testimony, and the state presented no evidence of a secular pur-
pose, choosing instead to rely on an accommodation argument. 166 This
history, combined with the fact that Alabama already had a moment-
of-silence statute, 167 led the Court to conclude that the statute had
either a religious purpose or none at all.168
At first blush, the decision in Wallace would seem nothing more
than a demonstration of judicial hairsplitting. Viewed in its simplest,
black-letter form, the case apparently holds that moment-of-silence
statutes for meditation are permissible, while those for voluntary
prayer are not; by using the proper legal incantation, a legislature can
enact a statute that will encourage prayer in the schools. However,
the essence of Wallace is the notion that the state must maintain a
position of neutrality toward religion, and that any effort to accommo-
date majoritarian religious beliefs must be made in a neutral manner.
This reasoning is in tune with the Court's previous decisions on the
issue of school prayer and leaves the free exercise rights of students
intact.
Prior to Wallace, the Court had rendered two major decisions on
prayer in public schools. In Engel v. Vitale,169 the Court struck down
a prayer that had been drafted by the New York State Board of Re-
gents for recitation in that state's public schools. The Court stated,
"New York's state prayer program officially establishes the religious
beliefs embodied in the Regent's prayer."170 Accordingly, the practice
clearly violated the establishment clause.
The second major school prayer decision was Abington School Dis-
trict v. Schempp.?17 That case involved a practice of Bible reading and
recitation of the Lord's Prayer at the outset of each school day. Stat-
ing that such a program was a "breach of [the] neutrality" required by
the establishment clause,172 the Court struck down the practice as
164. Id. at 2490-92.
165. Id. at 2490.
166. Id. at 2490-91.
167. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984). The Court notes that the only textual differ-
ence of any significance between § 16-1-20 and § 16-1-20.1 was the insertion of the
words "or voluntary prayer" in the latter provision. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct.
2479, 2491 (1985).
168. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2492 (1985).
169. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
170. Id. at 430.
171. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
172. Id. at 225.
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unconstitutional.
Two basic teachings can be gathered from Engel and Schempp.
First, organized prayer in public schools, even if it is notfully compul-
sory,' 73 still involves "indirect coercive pressure upon religious minor-
ities."174 Second, the conduct of such exercises is "in direct violation
of the rights"175 of such minorities. In light of these two principles,
the fate of the religiously motivated moment of silence in Wallace is
not surprising, but is, in fact, a proper and principled decision.
Yet, Wallace does not signal the demise of accommodation theory.
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor took great pains to point
out that the decision was based on the factual findings of religious pur-
pose and that moment-of-silence statutes were not per se unconstitu-
tional.176 This conclusion was based on two premises. First, a moment
of silence is not inherently religious. Second, students who participate
in a moment of silence need not compromise their beliefs.177 This rea-
soning would leave some life in accommodation theory, assuming the
purpose for the moment-of-silence law was ostensibly secular.
There are two major flaws in Justice O'Connor's analysis, and by
definition, the entire theory of accommodation. First, a moment of
silence, although not inherently religious, does seem to remove the
state from a position of neutrality toward religion. Second, the prac-
tice of organized, voluntary silent prayer does constitute an infringe-
ment on the rights of religious minorities. Both of these factors
implicate the second part of the Lemon test: the inquiry into whether
the effect of the statute is to advance or inhibit religion.
First, the demarcation of any given time period during the school
day as one during which prayers may be said, albeit silently,'7s plainly
removes the state from a position of neutrality towards religion.179 It
173. The practices at issue in both Engel and Schenpp were not compulsory in the
sense that there were provisions allowing students to not participate. In
Schempp, students were permitted to "absent themselves upon parental request."
Id. at 224-25. In Engel, no parental request was required; the students could
either remain silent or leave the room. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
174. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
175. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963).
176. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2498 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 2498-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
178. Perhaps the provision of a moment of silence for meditation alleviates some of
the concern with neutrality, but such a question may be rendered moot by the
conduct of a particular teacher. Evidence in Wallace indicated that teachers led
students in organized spoken prayer under the moment-of-silence statute. Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2484 n.23 (1985).
179. In addition, the state may be in the position of preferring those religions that
either believe in prayer, believe in individual prayer, or believe in unspoken
prayer to those that do not. While such a point cuts more toward the issue of
infringement of minority rights, it is relevant to note that the best characteriza-
tion that can be placed upon voluntary silent prayer is its preference of religion
over non-religion. Such a position is unconstitutional. See infra note 180.
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places the state in the position of advocating some form of religion
over none at all.' 8 0 While the observance of a moment of silence may
not place any direct pressure upon the student to pray, it seems clear
that there is, inherent in the situation, "indirect coercive pressure"81
to engage in prayer.
In addition, the practice of a moment of silence for voluntary
prayer clearly infringes the rights of religious minorities. Although
the infringement may be substantially lessened in the absence of a
suggestion of prayer, it is still beyond that which is constitutionally
permissible. While a nonpraying student is not readily identifiable by
his praying peers, it is not difficult to conceive of students whose be-
liefs might require them to leave the classroom during the silent
prayer. The consequences of such a withdrawal are documented.18 2
In addition, the demonstrated potential for teacher abuselSS of a mo-
ment-of-silence provision further threatens religious minorities.
In essence, the practice of observing a moment of silence places the
state in the position of encouraging (at least implicitly) some form of
religious activity. Inherent in the concept of any organized moment of
silence are indirect coercive pressure and infringement of the rights of
religious minorities. These factors tend to implicate the "effect" in-
quiry of the Lemon test, in that a moment of silence advances the reli-
gion of the majority through indirect coercive pressure and inhibits
minority religions by placing their adherents in difficult situations.'8 4
Further, the degree of supervision required to curb potential abuses of
a moment-of-silence statute would make the implementation of one
which was, in fact, religiously neutral extremely difficult.85
But what of the free exercise rights of public school students? The
theme of this Article has been to suggest that students should enjoy
their constitutional rights to the utmost extent possible in the some-
180. This is an impermissible position: "[t]he individual freedom of conscience pro-
tected by the first amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or
none at all." Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2488 (1985) (footnote omitted).
181. See supra note 174 and accompanying text. See also supra note 178 for an exam-
ple of more direct coercive pressure.
182. See, e.g., Nat'l Law J., Apr. 1, 1985, at 8, col. 1, for a report on a decision of a West
Virginia federal district court that struck down that state's constitutional provi-
sion for silent prayer. The court noted that one of the primary factors behind its
decision was testimony from Jewish students who were persecuted by their
Christian classmates for not participating in the moment of prayer.
183. See supra note 178.
184. See supra note 182.
185. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor states that the fundamental inquiry into
the purpose of a moment-of-silence statute is whether the state has conveyed a
message of endorsement of religion, a message that "seem[s] inescapable if the
teacher exhorts children to use the designated time to pray." Wallace v. Jaffree,
105 S. Ct. 2479, 2499 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Given the abuse of the
Alabama statute, supra note 178, it is difficult to understand how the fine line
between accommodation and endorsement could be preserved.
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what restrictive environment of the schoolhouse. Certainly, free exer-
cise rights are equally as important as those of due process, free
expression, and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.
Contrary to popular belief, the free exercise rights of students are
generally intact. Nothing in Engel or Schempp prohibited voluntary
prayer in public schools, and, as Justice O'Connor noted in Wallace,
"[n]othing in the United States Constitution as interpreted by this
Court... prohibits public school students from voluntarily praying at
any time before, during, or after the school day."'1 6 In fact, resort to a
novel theory such as accommodation, fraught with all of its difficul-
ties, is utterly unnecessary to protect the free exercise rights of stu-
dents. They can be adequately protected through existing principles
of law.
The underlying flaw in the accommodation theory is that a daily
ritualistic moment of silence is not truly voluntary. Voluntary, spon-
taneous prayer can be protected by use of the standard set forth in
Tinker. Thus, a student's prayer, or any other religious exercise,
would be protected unless it involved a "material and substantial in-
terference" with the school environment. 8 7
The application of the Tinker standard to religious exercise in pub-
lic school accomplishes the nominal goale8s of accommodation theo-
rists; it protects truly voluntary silent prayer. n so doing, it protects
the free exercise rights of the same majority of students that moment-
of-silence statutes seek to protect. 8 9 But it does so with one great
advantage, that being the absence of indirect coercion and state in-
volvement. This distinguishing feature avoids the establishment
clause violations inherent in the moment-of-silence statute.190
Conceptually, the application of the Tinker standard to the free
186. Id. at 2479, 2496.
187. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
188. I would argue that the true motivation behind accommodation theory as cur-
rently formulated is to place the state in a position of advocating religious exer-
cise. This is due primarily to the accommodationist obsession with some type of
organized prayer.
189. Admittedly, application of the Tinker standard will not accord the same protec-
tion to all students. Certain religious practices may be so disruptive as to be im-
permissible within the confines of the classroom. But those practices receive no
greater protection from moment-of-silence statute than under the Tinker stan-
dard. Moreover, the absence of state direction and indirect coercion from the
Tinker model serves to protect the rights of religious minorities to a far greater
degree than would a daily ritual of silence.
190. Based on the information in note 189, supra, one might believe that there was an
establishment of those religions whose worship practices fit within the confines
of the Tinker standard. Such an argument overlooks two important factors.
First, use of the Tinker standard precludes acts of religious worship because of a
substantial governmental interest, unrelated to the suppression of free religious
expression: the maintenance of an orderly educational environment. Cf. United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Second, since there is no affirmative state
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exercise rights of students makes a great deal of sense. There is prece-
dent for the application of free speech principles to religious prac-
tices.191 In addition, since the Tinker standard is, in reality, content-
neutral,192 its use comports with existing first amendment law193 and
affords a maximum amount of religious freedom.
Placing the free exercise rights of students on an equal footing
with their rights of free expression would result in consistent, easily
applied law.194 It would eliminate the disadvantages and establish-
ment clause violations that inhere in moment-of-silence statutes.195
And it would protect truly voluntary religious practices. Use of such a
standard provides the optimal means of vindicating the religious rights
of all students, affording the vast majority an opportunity to engage in
the religious practices they choose, while at the same time protecting
the minority from even the most subtle state coercion.
VII. CONCLUSION
The scope of students' constitutional rights is one of the most im-
portant issues in law today. Yet, the rights of students are often ne-
glected, forgotten, or overlooked completely.196 Such a state of affairs
is extremely distressing, since our constitutional values represent the
embodiment of the most fundamental beliefs of our Founding Fathers.
In order that our young people may share in some of "our most cher-
action encouraging religious practice, it is difficult to perceive any establishment
clause violation.
191. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (applying public forum doctrine
to allow religious groups to meet on campuses of state universities).
192. Although some have suggested that the Tinker standard does regulate content,
see Horning, supra note 35, at 944, it seems that the prohibition of material and
substantial disruption is more akin to time, place, and manner restrictions. Of
course, it is possible that the standard could be applied by school officials in a
discriminatory manner, but the same criticism can be made of any content-neu-
tral standard of speech (or religious) protection.
193. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding regulation of speech
if it furthers substantial government interest, unrelated to the suppression of free
expression).
194. For those lawmakers who are concerned with statutorily "informing" students of
their prayer rights, there would seem to be no objection to a statute based on the
Tinker standard.
195. Arguably, moment-of-silence statutes do nothing more than create a forum, simi-
lar to that created for free speech by student government. But the important
difference between the two situations is the establishment clause. No constitu-
tional provision restrains the state in creating a free speech forum, but the estab-
lishment clause substantially restricts the state's ability to create a religious
forum.
196. As I have discussed this Article with my colleagues, the most frequent response
has been "that's easy, students have no rights."
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ished ideals,"19 7 it is necessary that they be exposed to them at an
early age, so they may fully appreciate their utility. As a part of the
development of this appreciation, the students should be given the
broadest possible protection for those rights within the context of the
school environment.
Decisions of an earlier time, such as Tinker, Barnette, and, to a cer-
tain extent Goss, reinforce these cherished values and ideals. In par-
ticular, Tinker and Barnette represent the accordance of the
maximum possible protection to students with regard to one of the
most fundamental freedoms of our society, that of expression. But
more recent decisions, such as Ingraham and T.O., display a mis-
guided reverence for authoritarianism 9S and a Machiavellian view to-
ward the goal of "education." Little consideration is given to the fact
that one of the paramount functions of our educational system should.
be to cultivate individuality, the basis for the founding of this country.
Arguably, Wallace may represent a continuation of that trend, unless
it stands for the principle that the state may take no action to pro-
mote religious activity, thereby subtly coercing students into a nause-
ating religious homogeneity.
The authoritarian trend of the Court in the most recent students'
rights cases certainly is not unique to that particular area of constitu-
tional law,199 but its application in that area may hold the greatest
potential damage. The seeds of intolerance already have been planted
in our nation's schools. 2 00 One fears to contemplate what the future
will hold for a nation that has been educated on the underlying prem-
ise that the government has nearly unlimited authority over its citi-
zens, and that its constitutional guarantees are merely idle platitudes
that can be balanced away. When determining the rights of students,
such potential impact should be the primary focus of consideration,
lest it become a historical afterthought, incapable of remedy.
Michael J Hickman '86
197. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 767 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting).
198. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 92.
199. See, e.g., supra note 146.
200. See supra note 40.
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